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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to discuss the interconnections between informal economy and Value 
Added Tax (VAT), as well as measures applied in the European Union (EU) Member States and other 
countries to counter VAT evasion and VAT fraud related to informal economy. It is shown in the article, 
that VAT and informal economy are strongly interconnected. VAT may be the cause for growth of the 
informal economy. But on the other hand, some VAT-related measures may be introduced to reduce or at 
least stop further growth of informal economy. Examples of such measures conclude the findings.
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1. Aims and Scope
The aim of this paper is to discuss the interconnections between 
informal economy and Value Added Tax (VAT), as well as measures applied 
in the European Union (EU) Member States (MS) and other countries to 
counter VAT evasion and VAT fraud related to informal economy.
2. Informal Economy and Taxation
Informal economy (grey economy) includes supplies of goods and 
services which are legal themselves, but produced and supplied outside 
the framework of registered business. Informal economy must be clearly 
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distinguished from criminal economy (black economy), which supplies 
illegal goods and services (e.g. drugs, weapons). Informal economy 
includes professional activities performed for profit, but not registered, not 
taxed and not subject to official monitoring. Sometimes entrepreneurs are 
registered, but they hide part of their activities, by non-reporting a part 
of their sales or unregistering part of their employees. Informal economy 
also includes so called „moonlighting”, when people formally employed, 
additionally perform work outside the formal economy.1 
It must be emphasized that informal economy is not only about 
non-compliance with tax laws. It is also connected with unwillingness 
to comply with social security, environmental protection or health and 
safety regulations. Sometimes it is about infringement of intellectual 
property rights or employees’ rights. Some people stay in the shadow 
to maintain certain government benefits (e.g. unemployment benefits, 
subsidized healthcare, subsidized housing). There are also psychological 
motivations, above all, social acceptance of informal economy. If the 
quality of government institutions and benefits is poor, social acceptance 
for informal economy grows. If people consider the tax system unfair, the 
tax burden too high, the government tax and spending policy wrong, they 
tend to turn to informal economy.2 
As regards the relation between informal economy and the tax concepts 
of evasion and avoidance, informal economy is rather tax evasion than 
tax avoidance. Tax evasion is generally understood as intentional illegal 
taxpayer behavior, involving a direct violation of tax law, in order to escape 
1  For various definitions of informal economy see S. Pedersen, E. Dalgaard and 
G.V. Mogensen, The Shadow Economy in Western Europe: Measurement and Results for 
Selected Countries, Copenhagen 1998; F. Schneider, D. Enste, Shadow Economies Around 
the World – Size, Causes, and Consequences, IMF Working Paper, WP/00/26, IMF, 
Washington 2000; S. Djankov, I. Lieberman, J. Mukherjee, T. Nenova, Going Informal: 
Benefits and Costs, World Bank, 2002; B. Belev, The Informal Economy in the EU Accession 
Countries: Size, Scope, Trends and Challenges in the Process of EU Enlargement, CSD, 2003; 
K. Flodman Becker, The Informal Economy: Fact Finding Study, The Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) Department for Infrastructure and Economic 
Cooperation, 2004; F. Schneider, The Shadow Economy in Europe 2013, Linz 2013; 
N. Benjamin, K. Beegle, F. Recanatini, M. Santini, Informal Economy and the World Bank, 
Policy Research Working Paper 6888, The World Bank, Washington 2014.
2 For a broader analysis of the reasons behind the growth of informal economy and 
the problems caused by informal economy (not only in a tax context) see: F. Schneider, 
D.  Enste, op. cit.; S. Djankov, I. Lieberman, J. Mukherjee, T. Nenova, op. cit.; B. Belev, 
op. cit.; K. Flodman Becker, op. cit.; F. Schneider, op. cit.
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payment of tax, either by hiding tax liability or its part from tax authorities 
or simply failing to pay tax. Examples of evasion are: failure to register 
with tax authorities, deliberate non-reporting or underreporting of taxable 
income or sales, claiming deductions for expenses not incurred, overstating 
expenses. Tax evasion also includes tax fraud, which is conducted with 
the use of sham transactions, false statements, fake documents, etc. On 
the other hand, tax avoidance is taxpayer behavior aimed at reducing tax 
liability, but not being tax evasion and not being illegal. Tax avoidance is 
acting within the letter of the law, but against the spirit or intent of the law. 
It involves artificiality (e.g. adoption of an artificial legal form) or more 
generally – choices motivated by tax savings and not commercial reasons. 
Examples of tax avoidance include: conversion of one type of income to 
other type which is non- or lower-taxed, shifting of income to other tax 
jurisdictions with lower tax rates or other (affiliated) taxpayers with a lower 
marginal tax rate, treaty shopping, splitting of business activities to avoid 
VAT registration, lease and lease-back arrangements to take advantage of 
early input tax deduction.3
Informal economy and VAT are strongly interconnected. Businesses 
remaining in the grey zone and not charging VAT on their supplies benefit 
from an unfair competitive advantage over white zone businesses, being 
able to offer lower prices to their customers, especially consumers and 
other grey zone businesses. However, it is worth noting that in most VAT 
systems, including the EU common system of VAT,4 a formal registration 
of a business is not a condition for its supplies being VAT taxable.5 
3 J. Rogers-Glabush (ed.), IBFD International Tax Glossary, 7th ed., Amsterdam 2015, 
pp. 30–31, 172–173, 195–196. See also OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 
Glossary of Tax Terms, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm#A [access: 
11.05.2016]. According to the OECD’s Glossary, “Evasion” is “generally used to mean 
illegal arrangements where liability to tax is hidden or ignored, i.e. the taxpayer pays 
less tax than he is legally obligated to pay by hiding income or information from the tax 
authorities”, “fraud” is ”a form of deliberate evasion of tax which is generally punishable 
under criminal law. The term includes situations in which deliberately false statements 
are submitted, fake documents are produced, etc.”, while “avoidance” is “generally used to 
describe the arrangement of a taxpayer’s affairs that is intended to reduce his tax liability 
and that although the arrangement could be strictly legal it is usually in contradiction with 
the intent of the law it purports to follow”. 
4 See Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system 
of value added tax (the EU VAT Directive), OJ L 347, 11.12.2006, p.1.
5 The concepts of “taxable person” and “economic activity” as defined by Art. 9(1) of 
the EU VAT Directive are objective. “Taxable person” is “any person who, independently, 
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Thus, non-registered businesses, if discovered, should be liable to pay 
VAT on heretofore supplies, although they did not collect the amounts 
corresponding to output VAT from their customers. 
3. VAT-related Motives for Informal Economy
The mere introduction of VAT, as well as any significant increase in 
VAT rates, may induce the escape of formal business into the grey zone or 
prevent informal business from entering the white zone. As studies show, 
suppliers are not always able to fully shift the burden of VAT to customers 
without worsening their market position.6 When VAT is introduced or rates 
carries out in any place any economic activity, whatever the purpose or results of that 
activity”. “Economic activity” is “any activity of producers, traders or persons supplying 
services, including mining and agricultural activities and activities of the professions”. 
No mention is made in the EU VAT Directive about VAT registration (identification) or 
business registration as preconditions for supplies being taxable. Moreover, according to 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), even supply of contraband alcohol is 
taxable, because “the principle of fiscal neutrality prevents any general distinction between 
lawful and unlawful transactions, apart from such cases where any competition between 
a lawful economic sector and an unlawful sector is precluded. Ethyl alcohol imported as 
contraband from a non-member country is not a product whose marketing is prohibited 
by its very nature or because of its special characteristics. Nor may ethyl alcohol be 
regarded as a product which is outside economic channels, since competition is possible 
between the contraband product and that traded in lawful economic channels, in that 
there is a lawful market in alcohol which is precisely the target of contraband products” 
(see CJEU, judgment of 29 June 2000, case C-455/98 Tullihallitus v Kaupo Salumets 
and others, EU:C:2000:352). Unregistered businesses are in competition with registered 
businesses. Consequently, supplies made by unregistered businesses are evidently taxable.
6  In reality the full shifting of VAT burden to the customer is not always possible 
(J. English, VAT/GST and Direct Taxes: Different Purposes, [in:] M. Lang, P. Melz, 
E.  Kristoffersson (eds.), Value Added Tax and Direct Tax. Similarities and Differences, 
Amsterdam, 2009, p. 1). In reality VAT burden is born partially by the consumers and 
partially by the suppliers, as the net price and the size of sales after tax are usually lower 
than before tax; besides the taxation of one good or service increases the demand for 
substitution goods or services (S. James, Taxation Research, [in:] M. Lamb, A. Lymer, 
J. Freedman, S. James (eds.), Taxation. An Interdisciplinary Approach to Research, Oxford 
2005, p. 40). Suppliers in order to maintain their competitive position and attractiveness of 
their offer to customers, usually decide to partially bear the burden of the tax; the effective 
distribution of VAT burden therefore depends also on market conditions, the flexibility 
of consumer demand and competition between suppliers (L. Ebrill, M. Keen, J.P. Bodin, 
V. Summers, The Modern VAT, Washington 2001, p. 15). 
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are increased, suppliers may face lower sales if their decide to fully shift the 
new or increased burden to customers or lower profitability if they decide 
to bear part of the new or increased burden themselves. If these results are 
unacceptable to them, they may decide to join informal economy.
Also the businesses which are partly or wholly input taxed, so not 
allowed to deduct input VAT or its part, may prefer to stay in the grey 
zone and also to buy from other informal suppliers. Not only do they 
remain themselves unregistered, but also they buy from other unregistered 
businesses. Similarly, work intensive businesses, which do not incur 
high amounts of input VAT on their purchases, as workforce is their 
most important cost factor and not goods or services bought from other 
suppliers, may prefer the grey zone (e.g. housekeeping, child-minding, 
gardening, beauty care, basic medical advice). 
Another reasons for remaining on the informal side is burdensome 
VAT compliance. If its costly and/or time-consuming to register for VAT, to 
comply with documentation and reporting obligations, businesses will tend 
to operate informally.7 If VAT compliance requires hardware and software 
investments (e.g. cash registers, computers, printers, invoicing software), it 
may be too costly for a new business to become a VAT taxpayer.
If VAT regulation is too excessive, if it is difficult to understand and 
apply VAT provisions, if administrative practice is diverse and changing, 
informal economy will grow. Certainty in taxation is a very important 
compliance-enhancing factor. Already Adam Smith wrote that certainty is 
more important than equality, because uncertain taxes may induce non-
compliance of otherwise honest and law-abiding taxpayers.8 If it is difficult 
to understand and apply VAT provisions, if administrative practice is 
inconsistent, uncertainty and tax risk on the part of registered business are 
inevitably growing. Low detection probability and ineffective enforcement 
are other evident factors for the growth of informal economy. If there are 
too harsh penalties for unintended errors or if tax inspections are focused 
mainly or solely on registered businesses, while informal businesses remain 
undetected, businesses will be inclined to stay in the grey zone. In other 
words, if the risks and consequences of being a formal, generally complying 
7 Compliance costs are regressive and they are especially burdensome for small and 
medium sized businesses and above all – new businesses (J. Pope, Tax Compliance Costs, 
[in:] M. Lamb, A. Lymer, J. Freedman, S. James (eds.), op. cit., p. 210).
8 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, London 
1904 (first publ. 1776). 
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taxpayer punished for an unintended mistake are similar to the risks and 
consequences of being an unregistered business detected and punished for 
the failure to register and report tax liability, the chances that businesses 
will remain unregistered are growing.
4. Informal Economy-related Forms of VAT Evasion and Fraud
The most obvious form of VAT evasion by informal economy is when 
goods and services are supplied by unregistered business. In such a case the 
totality of supplies remains without VAT. 
But in terms of VAT, informal economy may also take the form of 
off-books sales by registered business, i.e. underreporting of VAT taxable 
supplies, when only some supplies are made without VAT, while others are 
reported.
Informal economy may also constitute a part of more complex VAT 
fraud schemes. For example, goods of informal origin may be introduced 
to the formal market accompanied by false invoices (issued by sham 
businesses9 or with the use of hijacked data10). Such invoices give rise 
to deductions of input VAT, while output VAT is never settled with tax 
authorities. If a business buys goods informally, upon selling these goods 
full output VAT must be paid to tax authorities (there is no input VAT to 
deduct). A solution is to fake a purchase invoice, to pretend that VAT on 
previous stages was already settled with tax authorities. 
Informal economy also adds to VAT fraud by consuming and 
distributing goods which were “taken out of the system”, i.e. sold without 
VAT under false pretenses of an intra-EU, thus zero-rated, supply of 
goods. The fraud begins when the supplier deducts input VAT, but does 
not charge output VAT, selling the goods with zero VAT. Zero rate applies 
to intra-EU supplies, because such supplies should be taxed in the MS 
of destination and the customer should pay VAT to the tax authorities of 
the MS of destination. If the supplier and/or the customer pretend that 
the supply is an intra-EU supply, zero rated in the MS of origin, while the 
9 A sham business is a business registered under the name of a person who is not 
really involved in the business activity, usually being troubled, unemployed, homeless or 
terminally ill, without any property to enforce taxes.
10 Hijacking of data refers to the use of the data of a real business, which is not involved 
in and not aware of the transaction.
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tax in the MS of destination is never paid and the goods never leave the 
MS of origin, they may be resold cheaper in the grey market, without any 
VAT inherent in their price. 
5. VAT-related Measures Against Informal Economy
Some VAT-related measures may be introduced to reduce or at least 
stop further growth of informal economy. 
First of all, VAT exemptions for small business or certain grey-zone 
prone sectors may be introduced, applicable only upon prior notification 
by a formally registered business. So if a business registers, it may benefit 
from the exemption. If a business does not register and is detected by tax 
authorities, the business must pay VAT on all heretofore supplies. Also 
helpful may be relatively low VAT rates on the most grey-zone prone goods 
and services. The grey-zone prone sectors or goods and services include for 
example: household services (cleaning, babysitting, house maintenance), 
private teaching, beauty care, taxis, car repair, retail supply of food, 
restaurant services, fast food, construction services.11
It is very important to simplify VAT compliance: registration, invoicing 
and reporting obligations. Electronic means of communication should be 
used more extensively, to minimize the need for visits in tax offices. Taxpayers 
should also be given comprehensive assistance in VAT compliance: from 
guidance to refunds on the purchase of necessary hardware and software. 
At least guidance in the form of brochures and public and private rulings 
should be available. A very useful institution is a taxpayer assistant, i.e. a tax 
inspector designated with the task of assisting taxpayers of a given branch of 
economy with their compliance and being aware of the problems and specifics 
of the branch. The government should participate in the costs of hardware 
and software necessary for VAT compliance (e.g. cash registers, invoicing 
software), by grating refunds on the purchase of the equipment and software.
Tax administration should be client-oriented, but also effective in 
auditing. Tax audits should be better targeted, preceded by risk analysis 
and not only focused on formal business. If registered businesses get the 
11 For examples of goods and services (sectors of economy) which are likely to be 
included in grey economy see: F. Schneider, The Shadow Economy in Europe 2013, Linz 
2013, pp. 11–13; S. Pedersen, E. Dalgaard, G.V. Mogensen, The Shadow Economy in Western 
Europe: Measurement and Results for Selected Countries, Copenhagen 1998, pp. 46, 85–86.
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impression that only they are controlled and punished even for unintended 
errors, they will be more prone to escape to the grey zone.
Because informal economy is sometimes a matter of tradition or is 
considered an act of opposition towards government policy, the level of social 
acceptance of informal economy may be high. Then, something should be 
done to change social attitude towards informal economy. People should 
understand the role of taxes in financing public services. They should  be 
informed about the problems caused by informal economy. School education, 
publicity campaigns and brochures might be helpful in this respect. A popular 
measure against informal economy involves offering lottery prizes based 
on cash register receipts or VAT invoices (e.g. in Argentina, Brazil, Malta, 
Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Romania, Slovakia and Taiwan).12
Moreover, an obligation to use cash registers in business to consumer 
(B2C) transactions may be an efficient tool against informal economy, if 
this obligation is accompanied by: administrative or criminal sanctions for 
suppliers for not issuing receipts and/or for customers for not possessing 
a receipt, non-enforceability of consumer rights without a receipt and – as 
already mentioned – national lotteries for receipts holders. In case of business 
to business (B2B) transactions, an obligation to issue and deliver invoices 
via an online central invoice data-base could be useful, if accompanied by: 
criminal sanctions for suppliers for not issuing invoices within the system 
and/or business customers for not possessing a valid invoice delivered via 
the system, non-enforceability of commercial contracts not documented 
by invoices issued within the system, the prohibition of transporting goods 
not accompanied by a valid invoice issued within the system.13 The most 
12 For more information about VAT lotteries see J. Stanley-Smith, VAT Lotteries – Driving 
up Compliance from the Consumer’s End, “International Tax Review” 2015, 5.02., http://
www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3424923/VAT-lotteries-driving-up-compliance-
from-the-consumers-end.html [access: 11.05.2016]; L. Mattes, VAT Lotteries – The Ultimate 
Road Towards Tax Compliance and Social Awareness?, IBFD White Papers, 30 March 2015, 
Amsterdam 2015; DG  Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD), Joint Research Centre 
(JRC), Improving VAT Compliance – Random Awards for Tax Compliance, Report, Fiscalis 
Workshop, 6 May 2014, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
Luxembourg 2015; M. Fabbri, S. Hemels, “Do You Want a Receipt?” Combating VAT and 
RST Evasion with Lottery Tickets, “Intertax” 2013, no. 8, vol. 41, pp. 430–443.
13 For a description of the Brazilian system involving non-enforceability of commercial 
contracts not documented by invoices issued within the system and the prohibition of 
transporting goods not accompanied by a valid invoice issued within the system see 
R.T. Ainsworth, VAT – East African Community: The Tradable Services Problem World-Class 
Solution, “Boston University School of Law Working Paper” no. 13–38, 15.08.2013, pp. 25–28.
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drastic measure (the last resort measure) could be the seizure of equipment 
and goods possessed without a valid invoice or receipt.
An interesting alternative to the central invoice data-base could be an 
enhanced reporting obligation, whereby taxpayers regularly (e.g. monthly) 
electronically submit all B2B transactions data, including value of each 
purchase or supply transaction, its date and invoice number, as well as 
a VAT identification number of the supplier or the business customer. Such 
a solution has been gradually introduced in Poland, starting from larger 
taxpayers and as of 1 January 2018 covering all active VAT taxpayers14.
Another promising measure involves limits on cash payments, 
accompanied by mandatory reporting of credit card transaction data by 
banks (e.g. Portugal), cross checking of VAT returns with data on credit 
card transactions from the banks (e.g. Turkey), reduced VAT rates in 
case of non-cash payments (e.g. Argentina, Colombia), subsidized use of 
electronic payment terminals at small shops (e.g. Mexico).15
A measure widely used against some forms of VAT fraud, which are par-
tly related to informal economy, is reverse charge mechanism (RCM). Under 
RCM tax is settled (paid) by the business customer instead of the supplier. 
Hence, the supplier cannot embezzle VAT (the supplier receives VAT exclusi-
ve price only) and the customer cannot deduct input VAT if output VAT was 
not settled by him with tax authorities. Examples of transactions to which 
RCM may be applied in the EU include: construction works, supplies of used 
material and industrial and non-industrial waste, recyclable waste, supplies 
of raw and semi-finished metals, including precious metals, supplies of cere-
als and industrial crops including oil seeds and sugar beet, supplies of mobile 
telephones, microprocessors and central processing units, game consoles, 
tablet PC’s and laptops, telecommunication services.16
The price incentive inherent in buying goods and services from 
informal business or underreporting business, may be countered by joint 
and several liability of the purchaser for output VAT not settled with tax 
14 This solution is called the Unified Control File (Jednolity Plik Kontrolny) and has been 
regulated in Art. 82(1b) of the Polish General Tax Act of 29 August 1997, Journal of Laws of 
2017, item 201, amended with reference to Art. 109(3) the Polish Vat Act and the Polish Act 
of 11 March 2004 on Tax on Goods and Services (the Polish VAT Act), Journal of Laws of 
2017, item 1221, amended.
15 For details see F. Schneider, op. cit., pp. 14–20.
16 See Arts. 199–199b of the EU VAT Directive, as a legal basis for introducing reverse 
charge mechanism.
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authorities by the seller.17 This liability is applicable if the circumstances and 
conditions of the transaction were non-standard, e.g. the price was lower 
than market price without a valid commercial reason, the transaction was 
carried outside business premises or business hours. In Poland joint and 
several lability is applicable to business buyers of: selected steel products, 
fuels, selected forms of gold, digital cameras.18
The last measure to be presented in this paper is the split payment 
model whereby the customer pays net price to the supplier and VAT to 
the tax authorities. The customer receives from the supplier an invoice 
which includes net price and the amount of VAT. The customer splits the 
payment in two: he pays consideration (net price) to the supplier and the 
amount of VAT to the tax authorities or to a blocked VAT bank account 
of the supplier, which is under supervision of the tax authorities and can 
only be used by the supplier for paying VAT to the tax authorities or 
paying VAT to his suppliers to their blocked VAT bank accounts. If the 
whole payment is made to the supplier, the customer risk losing the right 
to deduct input VAT or can be held liable for the output VAT not paid 
to tax authorities by the supplier.19 Alternatively, the gross amount may 
be split by financial institutions (financial intermediaries) into net price 
transferred to the supplier’s bank account and VAT transferred to the 
special VAT account of the customer. Such an option is being considered 
in Poland.20
17 See Art. 205 of the EU VAT Directive, as a legal basis for introducing joint and 
several liability for payment of VAT.
18 See Art. 105a and Annex 13 to the Polish VAT Act.
19 For a more detailed description of split payment model see European Commission, 
Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying Document to the GREEN PAPER on the 
Future of VAT Towards a Simpler, more Robust and Efficient VAT System {COM(2010) 695 
final}, SEC(2010) 1455 final, Brussel 1.12.2010, pp. 102–104; PwC, Study on the Feasibility 
of Alternative Methods for Improving and Simplifying the Collection of VAT through the 
Means of Modern Technologies and/or Financial Intermediaries (final report TAXUD/2009/
AO-05, 20  September 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/
common/consultations/tax/ future _vat/vat-study_en.pdf [access: 10.05.2013], pp. 11–13, 
37–50.
20 See the Act of 9 November 2017 Amending the Act on Tax on Goods and Services 
and Certain Other Acts, submitted for consideration to the Senate of the Republic of 
Poland and the President.
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6. Conclusions
As has been shown, VAT and informal economy are strongly 
interconnected. VAT may be the cause for growth of the informal economy. 
But on the other hand, some VAT-related measures may be introduced to 
reduce or at least stop further growth of informal economy. To sum up, 
these measure may include inter alia:
– exemptions for small business or certain grey-zone prone sectors, 
applicable only upon prior notification by a formally registered business; 
– relatively low VAT rates on the most grey-zone prone goods and 
services;
– simplification of VAT compliance and assistance in VAT compliance 
(guidance and refunds on the purchase of necessary hardware and software);
– better targeted tax audits, not only focused on formal business;
– national lotteries for holders of cash register receipts or VAT invoices;
– an obligation to use cash registers, accompanied by: administrative 
or criminal sanctions for suppliers for not issuing receipts and/or for 
customers for not possessing a receipt, as well non-enforceability of 
consumer rights without a receipt;
– an obligation to issue and deliver invoices via an online central 
invoice data-base, accompanied by: criminal sanctions for suppliers for 
not issuing invoices within the system and/or business customers for 
not possessing a valid invoice delivered via the system, as well as non-
enforceability of commercial contracts without an invoice issued within 
the system;
– seizure of equipment and goods possessed without a valid invoice or 
receipt; 
– an obligation to regularly electronically submit all B2B purchase and 
supply transaction data;
– limits on cash payments and reduced VAT rates in case of non-cash 
payments, accompanied by mandatory reporting of credit card transaction 
data by banks;
– reverse charge mechanism whereby tax is settled (paid) by the business 
customer instead of the supplier, hence he supplier cannot embezzle VAT 
(the supplier receives VAT exclusive price only) and the customer cannot 
deduct input VAT if output VAT was not settled with tax authorities;
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– joint and several liability of the purchaser for output VAT, especially 
if the circumstances and conditions of the transaction where non-standard 
(e.g. price lower than market price without a valid commercial reason);
– split payment whereby the customer pays net price to the supplier 
and VAT to the tax authorities or the gross amount is split by financial 
institutions.
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Streszczenie. Celem artykułu jest omówienie wzajemnych relacji między szarą strefą gospodarki 
a podatkiem od wartości dodanej (VAT), a także środków stosowanych w państwach członkowskich 
Unii Europejskiej (UE) i innych państwach w celu przeciwdziałania uchylaniu się od opodatkowa-
nia i oszustwom VAT związanym z szarą strefą gospodarki. W artykule wykazano, że wzajemne za-
leżności między szarą strefą a VAT są silne. VAT może być przyczyną rozwoju szarej strefy. Z drugiej 
strony, pewne rozwiązania z zakresu VAT mogą zostać wprowadzone, aby zmniejszyć lub przynaj-
mniej zatrzymać rozwój szarej strefy. Przykłady takich środków zamykają konkluzje.
Słowa kluczowe: oszustwa VAT, uchylanie się od opodatkowania VAT, szara strefa, gospodarka 
nieformalna, środki zwalczania oszustw, środki zwalczania uchylania się od opodatkowania; 
niezarejestrowana działalność gospodarcza
